possible randomizations for the given sample, not to the population from which the sample was (nonrandomly) drawn.
The Significance Test Controversy
Up until about 50 years ago, traditional significance tests were about the only statistical inferential methods used. There had been occasional arguments among research methodologists concerning the approach of R.A. Fisher versus that of Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson; see, for example, the interesting discussion between Berkson (1942 Berkson ( , 1943 and Fisher (1943) concerning the linearity of a set of data, and Salzburg's (2001) fascinating account of Fisher's conflicts with Karl Pearson (Egon's better-known father) and with Neyman. A few researchers even argued in favor of the use of Bayesian inference, but most articles published in the professional journals continued to emphasize traditional significance testing.
That all started to change when Morrison and Henkel (1970/2006) compiled a book on the significance test controversy. The individual chapters were written by various people who were concerned about the overuse and/ or misuse of significance tests, especially in sociology, along with a few defenders of the status quo. Things really came to a head in the 1980s with the publication of a set of articles in the journal Social Service Review (Cowger, 1984; Cowger, 1985; Glisson, 1985; Rubin, 1985) ; the often-cited article by Gardner and Altman (1986) , and the chapter by Woolson and Kleinman (1989) regarding practices in medicine and epidemiology. Then, in the late 1990s, there appeared the book, What if There Were No Significance Tests? edited by Harlow, Mulaik, and Steiger (1997) , with an emphasis on psychological and educational research. The latter work, like the Morrison and Henkel book, consisted of chapters written by people with different points of view, most of whom argued that significance tests should be replaced by confidence intervals around the corresponding "effect sizes."
In the last 10 years or so, confidence intervals have begun to replace significance tests, but significance tests still have their defenders. In public health and medicine, and to a lesser extent in nursing, there has been a recent tendency to emphasize interval estimation (usually 95% confidence intervals) while reporting a variety of p values that correspond to the area(s) in the tail(s) of the relevant sampling distribution(s).
Confidence Intervals: The Alleged Panacea
One of the arguments against significance tests has been that many users of them botch the wording when they report the results of their studies. For example, many methodologists have rightly objected to statements such as "the probability is less than .05 that the null hypothesis is true." (Cohen [1994] made the unfortunate mistake of claiming that some people say, "the probability is less than .05 that the null hypothesis is false.") The null hypothesis is either true or false. There is no probability associated with it, at least in the classical, non-Bayesian context. The probability applies to the likelihood of the sample finding, given that the null hypothesis is true; that is, it is a conditional probability.
Some claim that the wording of confidence intervals is much more straightforward, and researchers are less likely to say the wrong things. Not so, say Cumming (2007) , Cumming and Finch (2005) , Moye (2006) , and others. For every user of significance tests who says, "The probability is less than .05 that the null hypothesis is true" you can find some user of confidence intervals who says, "The probability is .95 that my interval includes the parameter." Your particular interval does not have a .95 probability; the probability, if that word is even relevant for confidence intervals, applies to all such intervals created in the same way.
The one sense in which confidence intervals constitute a panacea is that you do not have to do any hypothesizing beforehand. Researchers often find it difficult to specify the magnitude of a parameter in which they are interested, whether the basis for that specification be theory, previous research, or whatever. With interval estimation, all you need to do is specify the confidence you want to have and the margin of error that is tolerable (usually the half-width of the confidence interval), and the requisite sample size for "capturing" the parameter can be determined.
One Size Confidence Interval, Different p Values
There recently appeared two articles concerned with smoking cessation efforts, one in the medical literature (Peterson et al., 2009 ) regarding teenagers who smoke, and one in the nursing literature (Sarna et al., 2009 ) regarding nurses who smoke. Although the former was a randomized clinical trial and the latter was an observational study, both used the same statistical inferential approach of constructing 95% confidential intervals accompanied by actual p values.
The principal finding of the Peterson study was, "an intervention effect on 6-month prolonged smoking abstinence at 12 months after becoming intervention eligible (21.8% vs 17.7%, difference = 4.0%, 95% CI = -0.2 to 8.1%, P =.06)" (p. 1383). Two supplementary findings were "Among female and male smokers, respectively, the corresponding intervention effects were 5% (95% CI = 0.5 to 10%, P = .03) and 2.9% (95% CI = -4.3 to 9.7%, P = .41)" (also same paragraph, p. 1383).
One of the principal findings of the multiple logistic regression analysis reported in the Sarna et al. (2009) study, comparing "any quit attempt" with "no quit attempt" (the dichotomous dependent variable) for smokers of 10 to 19 cigarettes per day versus smokers of 20+ cigarettes per day (one of the independent variables) was an odds ratio of 2.43, 95% confidence interval = 1.07 to 5.52, p = .03 (Table 4 , p. 253). Another finding from that analysis for another independent variable, baccalaureate versus graduate degree, was an odds ratio of 1.54, 95% confidence interval = 0.65 to 3.66, p = .33 (Sarna et al., 2009, p. 253) .
This approach was referred to earlier in this editorial as a hybrid combination of constant confidence interval percentage and varying p values. If authors are concerned solely with 95% confidence intervals, they should be concerned solely with .05 p values. In the Peterson study, for example, the 95% confidence interval for that difference of 4.0% in prolonged smoking abstinence did not include odds ratios of 1.00, so it follows that p is less than .05. Should the reader of the article care that p is actually .03? No. The only justification for reporting actual p values in conjunction with 95% confidence intervals is the incorporation in a meta-analysis with p values from other studies carried out on the same topic.
No Significance Tests or Confidence Intervals
Whether to use significance tests, confidence intervals, or both, pales in comparison to the more serious matter of the appropriateness of any inferential statistics. The standard argument is easy to espouse. Use traditional inferential statistics if and only if you have a random sample from a well-defined population. However, a number of researchers disagree.
First, there are the "regarders," those who do not have a random sample but who like to think of it as a sample from which a statistical inference can be made to a population of entities "like these." They refuse to quit after reporting the descriptive statistics, apparently because they find it difficult and/or unsatisfying to interpret the data without the benefits of inferential statistics.
Second, there are the "populations are samples, too" advocates, who insist on carrying out some sort of statistical inference when they actually have data for an entire population. The inference is allegedly from a population at one point in time to that same population at other points in time, even though the time point was not selected at random. (See the article by Berk, Western, & Weiss, 1995 , about this, along with the various reactions to that article in the same journal.)
A third "camp" uses significance tests to tell them, or help to tell them, how excited to get about a particular finding. I suggest the theoretical or clinical importance should provide the excitement, not inferential statistics.
Then, there are the "random is random" researchers who use traditional t tests or other general linear model techniques to carry out significance tests, rather than randomization (permutation) tests, when they have random assignment but do not have random sampling. Edgington and Onghena (2007) and others (e.g., Ludbrook & Dudley, 2000) have tried to get researchers to stop doing that, but to little avail. A traditional t test can occasionally be used as an approximation to a randomization test, if the researcher does not have easy access to the computer software that is sometimes necessary for carrying out a randomization test.
Shortly after Morrison and Henkel (1970/2006) compiled their book, the famous statistician John W. Tukey (1977) wrote his treatise on Exploratory Data Analysis. In his book, he claimed that descriptive statistics had been given short shrift and researchers should "massage" their data more carefully before, or instead of, carrying out statistical inferences. He provided several techniques for summarizing sample data, for example, stem-andleaf diagrams and q-q plots, that help to bring out certain features in the data that other descriptive statistics do not, and inferential procedures cannot.
Some Other Controversies
Should a study be limited to at most one statistical inference? (Some studies do not even warrant one.) Why do some researchers test the statistical significance of baseline differences between experimental and control groups in a randomized clinical trial? Do they not know that all such differences are due to chance, by definition? Do they not trust probability to balance the groups? Do they not understand that the significance test takes care of chance differences? Or how about one-sided versus twosided significance tests and confidence intervals? Cohen's (1965) delightful essay about an argument between Doctor One and Doctor Two should be read by everybody who cares about the specification of null and alternative hypotheses.
Summary
I have tried in this editorial to present some of the arguments pro and con the use of significance tests and confidence intervals. In the age of "big data," it is especially important to revisit where statistical inferences are justified and where they are either unwarranted or unnecessary. The recent articles by Kaplan, Chambers, and Glasgow (2014) and Wong, Chiang, Choi, and Loke (2016) directly address this matter.
